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Robert A. Divine's Blowing on the WimP is a professional historian's attempt to analyze the most important foreign policy debate of the Eisenhower years -the controversy over nuclear testing and its relationship to the SovietAmerican arms race. Divine, a prolific scholar from the University of Texas, pulled together all the memoirs, government hearings, magazine articles (scientific and popular), and newspaper accounts on this grim subject. He examined manuscripts at the Eisenhower Library, most notably the rich Ann Whitman Diary series, and the SANE papers at Swarthmore College. He also OJ. Garry Clifford is Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut and is author of THE CITIZENS SOLDIERS: THE PLATfSBURG TRAINING CAMP MOVEMENT, 1913 MOVEMENT, -1920 MOVEMENT, (1972 and co-author of AMERICAN FORIEGN POLICY: A HISTORY (1977).
R. DIVINE, BLOWING ON THE WIND: THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN DEBATE. (1978).
[hereinafter cited as DIVINE).
[Vol. III, No.1 utilized unclassified materials of the Atomic Energy Commission, even though security regulations rendered this source less helpful than it might have been. Although the book was in press before the Three Mile Island incident and the recent government hearings concerning excessive cancer rates in areas close to the Nevada testing grounds, Blowing on the Wind will not go unnoticed in the continuing debate on nuclear energy.
Beginning with the BRAVO hydrogen bomb test at Bikini atoll in March 1954, which led to the fall-out contamination of the Japanese fishing vessel Lucky Dragon, and concluding with the Test Ban Treaty of 1963,2 Divine captures both the controversy and its protagonists. His work is "without heroes or villians," and yet certain individuals are more heroic and some more villainous than others. For example, Admiral Lewis Strauss, head of the AEC, was convinced that continued testing posted only negligible health risks and that American nuclear superiority was all that prevented the Soviets from launching World War III and killing millions. Strauss thought the Lucky Dragon was a "red spy outfit" spying on the American tests.3 Scientists Linus Pauling and Edward Teller stood at opposite ends of the scientific debate over fall-out, each was certain on the basis of inadequate evidence that testing was either harmless (Teller) or a deadly menace (Pauling). Hubert Humphrey and Harold Stassen emerged as champions of test ban negotiations; Humphrey as the key Democratic critic in Congress, and Stassen, until his resignation early in 1958, as chief disarmament adviser in the Eisenhower administration. The Soviets were hardly cooperative. Whether offering to ban nuclear weapons entirely (but refusing to link nuclear weapons with other disarmament measures) or loudly promoting a test ban without inspection Oust after a series of Soviet tests), and Kremlin generally treated disarmament negotiations as a propaganda exercise. As with the Americans, the dictates of national security meant that the Soviets would J!latch test for test, weapon for weapon.
According to Divine, Eisenhower was caught in the middle. Initially skeptical due to national security concerns, the President began to consider test ban proposals in 1956. However, he backed off angrily when Adlai Stevenson challenged him on the subject during the presidential campaign. Thereafter he waivered with uncertainty while his diplomatic and scientific advisors debated with the AEC and Pentagon. John Foster Dulles' advocacy of a test ban in early 1958 seemed to tip the scales, and an unsupervised moratorium on testing was established for the remainder of Eisenhower's term. However, negotiations for a comprehensive treaty bogged down, largely over the issue of inspection. Serious talks ended after the U-2 Affair in May 1960. The Russians resumed testing in the summer of 1961 (including the awesome 58 3. DMNE supra note 1, at ix.
megaton blast) and the Kennedy administration repeated the deadly cycle. Only after the Cuban Missile Crisis did negotiations begin anew. These negotiations culminated in a treaty banning atmospheric tests in June 1963. 4 Since 1963, more nuclear tests have been conducted than in the period from 1945 to 1963, but nearly all have been underground and without fall-out. A theme certral to Divine's analysis is that the policy debate of the 1950s centered on nuclear testing because the real issue was too devastating, comtemplate. He comments that "instead of coping with the danger of all-out nuclear war in which the blast and heat and fall-out might destroy most of the American population, they focused on the less drastic but still insidious threat of poisoned milk and contaminated air." 5 The test ban became a kind of , 'magic talisman" to ward off the evil nightmare of atomic war. According to Divine, "not until the strident warnings of Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War, the fallout shelter scare, and the Cuban missile crisis ... did the American people finally comprehend the reality of nuclear catastrophe."6 In view ofthe strident arguments today in opposition to the S.A.L.T. II Treaty, and nuclear energy after Three Mile. Island, one wonders if the American people are still seeking a "magic talisman" and refusing to contemplate the most serious issues of co-existence in the nuclear age.
• 9 Cooper is particularly sarcastic about Dulles' plan for a Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA) to operate the waterway, especially since Nasser and his "Gyppos" proved incompetent without foreign pilots. 10 Prime Minister Anthony Eden, although portrayed more sympathetically, receives low marks for his diplomatic deceit and incompetent handling of the Suez military operation. However, the British chiefs of staff must share the blame with Eden. They remembered all too well the failure of the paratroop assault on Arnhem in 1944 and therefore insisted on a full air-sea-ground attack that took too long to implement."
As for Eisenhower, Cooper portrays the President in a limited role prior to the hospitalization of Dulles for cancer midway through the crisis. There is no doubt that Ike was thoroughly angry at the British-French-Israeli invasion. In one transatlantic telephone call he mistakenly gave a Prime Minister's aide "unshirted hell," believing the aide to be Eden himself. 12 Eisenhower insisted on a cease-fire and withdrawal of the UN. The President was largely responsible for the downfall of Eden's government and was soon promising American intervention in the Middle East to maintain stability. Harold MacMillan wryly observed that "the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 would have saved us all in 1956. "13 Although The Lion's Last Roar is primarily an historical work, Cooper has also considered contemporary issues. In describing the once proud British Empire in decline after World War II, i.e., slow to adjust to new international realities and mistaking revolutionary nationalism for something worse, Cooper has posed an obvious parallel for post-Vietnam America. He also writes about the "what if?" factor. 14 Because the State Department and White House were convinced in 1956 that England and France would not act without their knowledge, there was virtually no planning for other contingencies. Leaders in London and Paris, equally certain that the United States would support them in a pinch, had not bothered to plan any graceful exits. Finally Cooper notes that Washington is a "one-crisis-at-a-time community." While he does not provide a detailed analysis of the contemporaneous Soviet invasion of Hungary, the implication is that Eisenhower and Dulles mishandled that affair as well. 15 Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan's Force Without War l6 will not attract the popular readership of the other two volumes. Bearing the imprimatur of the Brookings Institution with sections written in the heavy jargon of Defense Department analysis, the book will no doubt be required reading among political science graduate students and members of the National Security Council. This important study has two broad objectives. It seeks first to examine the espisodes in which the United States has used armed force for political goals since World War II. In this setting it tries to identify trends in such uses of force "in terms of the context in which the military units were employed, and variations in the size, type, and activities of the military units themselves." 17 It also attempts to evaluate the long and short term effectiveness of the armed forces as a political instrument by analyzing the consequences of such factors as: the size, type, and acitivity of military units involved in the incident; the nature of the situation at which they were directed; the character of U.S. objectives; the international and domestic context in which the incident occurred; and the extent and type of diplomatic activity that accompanied the use of the armed forces. 18 Some thirty-three postwar incidents are subjected to rigorous comparative scrutiny in one section of aggregate analysis. In a second section case studies by five independent scholars of ten postwar episodes are recounted and analyzed in detail. The purpose here is to test generalizations resulting from the aggregate analysis. While not surprising to most students of recent American foreign policy, the book's findings are notable if only for the systematic manner in which they were obtained.
This reviewer preferred the historical case studies. David K. Hall has compared American military moves during the Laotian War of 1962 and the IndoPakistani War of 1971. Hall is less critical of Kennedy than Nixon. However, he argues that both military efforts were counterproductive and that "the impact of military signaling on the successful resolution of international conflict is typically less decisive than the impact of undramatic political and economic forces. "19 William B. Quandt's analysis of Lebanon (1958) and Jordan (1971) suggests that each American intervention, while successful in its short term goals, was not only based on shaky premises and misread local political conditions, but risked an expansion of commitments that would be counterproductive to U.S. interests. In the case of Jordan, the Nixon Administration's perception of the crisis of a test of will between the Super Powers precluded the 16 In an excellent concluding chapter that deserves attention in Washington, Blechman and Kaplan summarize the results of both the aggregate analysis and case studies. The discrete use of political force seems to be less successful in modifying state behavior than in preventing action. More favorable outcomes were also associated with attempts at affecting intranational situations rather than international ones. There also appears to be a direct relationship between the size of American forces, the firmness of the commitment, and the successful outcome. Nonetheless, Blechman and Kaplan are quick to observe that Vietnam was an exception to this rule. The authors suggest that armed force should not be used for the purpose of bluffing. It is axiomatic that when foreign decision-makers perceive that important American interests are involved, the discrete use of force produces favorable outcomes. Blechman and Kaplan conclude with one very important caveat: "we have found that over the longer term such uses of the armed forces were not often associated with positive outcomes. Decision-makers should thus not expect them to serve as substitutes for broader and more fundamental policies tailored to the realities of politics abroad. "21 PoliticaVmilitary operations have not served well as remedies for difficult international problems. At best they help stabilize situations and allow time for other forms of diplomacy to achieve lasting solutions.
It is refreshing to have such a cautiously non-interventionist message from scholars partially funded by the government. As Vietnam recedes from the national consciousness and as nostalgia for the good old days grows, there will be voices urging the greater use of military force. A defect of the Blechman and Kaplan study is that its analysis focuses on the international context and consequences of American political and military operations. There is little con- sideration of the domestic political ramifications of American intervention. Intervention might be counterproductive abroad, but sometimes it may be politically useful at home. The Mayaguez affair is a good example. David Hall observes that "few political executives can be expected to have both the intellectual detachment and the political courage to state publicly that the risks of escalation associated with U.S. military deployment were assumed necessarily.' '22 Perhaps alter reading Force Without War they might at least understand the realities.
